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THE MINISTRY
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
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SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
Independence - Freedom - Happiness
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No.
30/2012/TT-BKHCN
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Hanoi,
December 28, 2012
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CIRCULAR
THE REGULATIONS ON NUCLEAR SAFETY APPLICABLE TO THE DESIGNS
OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Pursuant to the Law on Atomic Energy dated
June 03, 2008;
Pursuant to the Government's Decree No.
28/2008/NĐ-CP dated March 14, 2008, defining the functions, tasks, powers and
organizational structure of the Ministry of Science and Technology;
Pursuant to the Government's Decree No.
70/2010/NĐ-CP dated June 22, 2010, specifying and guiding a number of articles
of the Law on Atomic Energy applicable to nuclear power plants;
At the proposal of the Director of the
Vietnam Agency for radiation and nuclear safety;
The Minister of Science and Technology issues
a Circular on the regulations on nuclear safety applicable to the designs of
nuclear power plants
Chapter I
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Article 1. Scope of
regulation
This Circular deals with the general regulations
on nuclear safety applicable to nuclear power plants.
Article 2. Subjects of
application
This Circular is applicable to the investors,
the organizations that participate in the consultation, design, manufacture,
construction, repair, maintenance, operation, design appraisal, and licensing
of nuclear power plants.
Article 3. Interpretation of
terms
In this Circular, the terms below are construed
as follows:
1. The plant states is all possible states
of the nuclear power plant, including the normal operation and abnormal
operation (hereinafter referred to as operational state), the state upon the
occurrence of design basis accidents and beyond design basis accidents
(hereinafter referred to as accident conditions).
2. Normal operation is a state in which the
nuclear power plant operates within certain operational limits and conditions.
Normal operation includes start-up, power operation, reactor shutdown,
maintenance, testing, and refueling.
3. Abnormal operation is a deviation from the
normal operation that is expected to occur at least once during the operating
lifetime of the nuclear power plant without significantly impacting the items
important to safety or leading to accident conditions.
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5. Beyond design basis accidents are the
accidents that are more severe than the design basis accidents. The nuclear
power plant might suffer damage upon the occurrence of such accidents. They are
assessed to provide solutions for improving the resistance of the nuclear power
plant and limit the radioactive consequences to an acceptable level.
6. Postulated initiating events are the
postulated accidents directly arising out of the damage of the structure,
system, parts, or operation errors, and the damage directly arising out of the
internal and external hazards during the nominal power operation, low power
operation, or reactor shutdown.
7. Deterministic safety analysis is the
method for anticipating the phenomena likely to occur after a postulated
initiating event by applying certain acceptance criteria and principles.
Deterministic safety analysis including neutronic, thermal-hydraulic,
radioactive, thermomechanical, and structural analysis using calculation
instruments.
8. Probabilistic safety analysis is a
systematic approach to determining the risks, the damage scenarios of which the
probabilities are quantified by calculation instruments.
9. Severe accidents are beyond design basis
accidents that cause significant damage to the reactor core.
10. Accident management is a series of actions
during the evolution of a beyond design basis accidents for the purpose of:
a) Preventing the escalation of an accident into
a severe accident;
b) Mitigating the consequences of a severe
accident (if any);
c) Achieving a long-term safe stable state.
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12. Controlled state is the a of the nuclear
power plant following an abnormal operation or accident in which the
fundamental safety functions are still can be ensured and maintained for a time
sufficient to take the measures for reaching a safe state.
13. Components are independent devices,
accessories, or components of systems such as pipelines, pumps, valves.
14. A system include the parts fit
together to perform a function such as the reactor system, cooling system,
control system.
15. Structure is the construction
designed to cover and protect, such as buildings, reactor vessels, fuel rods,
or supporting structures such as shelves and suspension frame.
16. Safety system is the system that ensures the
shutdown of reactors and the residual heat removal from the core, or limits the
consequences of abnormal operation and design basis accidents. The safety
systems include the protection system, the safety actuation system, and safety
system support features such as cooling, lubrication, and power supply.
17. Safety system support features is a
collection of equipment that provide services such as cooling, lubrication, and
power supply for the protection system and the safety actuation system.
18. Items important to safety are the items in
the safety group and of which the malfunction or failure may lead to radiation
exposure of the personnel or the public.
19. Ultimate heat sink is the atmosphere, the
sea, the rivers or lakes to which the residual heat of the nuclear power plant
is transferred.
20. Coolant pressure boundary is the pressure
parts, including:
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b) The parts connected to the reactor coolant
system such as the peripheral containment isolation valve at the pipe that
penetrates the containment, the secondary isolation valve that is closed during
the normal operation at the pipe that does not penetrate the containment, the
discharge valve and safety valve of the reactor coolant system.
21. The design basis is the conditions,
processes, and natural or human factors taken into account in the design of the
nuclear power plant, so that the safety system of the nuclear power plant is
still operational according to the design without exceeding the authorized
limits upon the occurrence of such conditions, processes, and factors.
22. Safety limits are the range of the
operational parameters within which the operation of the nuclear power plant is
proven safe.
23. Common cause failures are failures of two or
more structures, systems, and components due to a single specific event or
cause.
24. Single failure is a failure that results in
loss of capability of a component to perform its intended safety functions, or
any consequential failure that results from the loss of capability to perform
safety functions.
25. Single failure criterion is a criterion (or
requirement) applied to a system in order to such that it must be capable of
performing its tasks in the presence of any single failure.
26. Diversity is the presence of two or more
redundant systems or components to perform a certain function. The attributes
of these systems and parts are different so as to reduce the possibility of
common cause failures.
27. Redundancy is the provision of alternative
(identical or diverse) structures, systems and components so that any one can
independently perform the same function regardless of the state of operation or
failure of any other.
28. Physical separation is the separation by
geometry such as distance, orientation, by appropriate barriers, or by a
combination thereof.
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Chapter II
GENERAL REGULATIONS ON NUCLEAR SAFETY APPLICABLE
TO THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DESIGN
Article 4. General
requirements for the nuclear power plant design
1. The design of the nuclear power plant and the
items important to safety must ensure that safety functions can be performed
with necessary reliability. The nuclear power plant must be safely operated
within the operational limits and conditions throughout its intended lifetime,
can be safely decommissioned, and impacts on the environment are minimized.
2. The results of the
deterministic safety analysis and the probabilistic safety analysis shall be
examined to ensure that due consideration has been given to the prevention of
accidents and, and to the mitigation of consequences of accidents that occur.
3. The activity and volume
of the generation of radioactive waste and discharges are kept to the minimum.
4. The experience gained in
the design, construction, and operation of other nuclear power plants, as well
as the results of relevant research programs must be taken into account.
5. When assessing the
conformity of the design with the safety requirements prescribed in this
Circular, the standards established by competent State agencies, the producers’
standards, and the applicable international standards shall apply.
Article 5. Fulfillment of
fundamental safety functions
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2. The fundamental safety functions prescribed
in Clause 1 of this Article must be fulfilled under any plant state.
3. A systematic approach shall be taken to
identify:
a) The items important to safety necessary to
fulfill the fundamental safety functions;
b) The inherent features that contribute to
fulfilling the fundamental safety functions or affect the fundamental safety
functions under any plant state.
Article 6. Radiation protection
The conditions for radiation protection in the
nuclear power plant design must be satisfied, including:
1. The radiation doses to the site personnel and
the public do not exceed the prescribed limits, and they are kept as low as
reasonably achievable under any plant state.
2. The situations that might lead to high
radiation doses or major releases of radioactive material to the environment
must be practically eliminated.
3. The measure for mitigating radiological
consequences of highly possible accidents must be enhanced.
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1. The application of defence in depth is to
prevent and mitigate the consequences of the accidents that could lead to
harmful effects on people and the environment.
2. The levels of defence in depth shall be
independent as far as is practicable. The safety of the nuclear power plant
under each state must be proven when the protection level decreases.
3. Multiple physical barriers to the release of
radioactive material to the environment shall be provided.
4. The failures and deviation from normal
operation are minimized, and accidents are prevented as far as is practicable.
The minor deviation in the parameter of the nuclear power plant does not lead
to a cliff edge effect.
5. The control of plant behavior by means of
inherent and engineered features must be provided such that failures and
deviations from normal operation that require actuation of safety systems are
minimized or excluded.
6. The safety systems must be able to be
automatically activated in accident conditions.
7. The structures, systems, components, and
procedures for mitigating the consequences of failures and deviations during
normal operation that exceed the capability of safety systems shall be provided.
8. Multiple means for ensuring that the
fundamental safety functions are performed shall be provided, thereby ensuring
the effectiveness of the barriers and mitigating the consequences of any
failure or deviation from normal operation
9. To ensure that the defence in depth is
maintained, the following factors shall be prevented as far as is practicable:
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b) The failure of one or more barriers;
c) The failure of a barrier as a consequence of
the failure of another barrier;
d) The harmful consequences of errors in
operation and maintenance.
10. The capability of the first, or at most the
second, level of defence, ensured as far as is practicable when a failure or
deviation from normal operation occurs.
Article 8. Postulated
initiating events
1. A systematic approach shall be adopted to
identify all postulated initiating events that could result in serious
consequences, and the postulated initiating events with a significant frequency
of occurrence. These events must be considered in the design.
2. The postulated initiating events shall be
identified based on the basis of engineering judgment, and a combination of
deterministic and probabilistic assessments. The A justification of the extent
of usage of deterministic safety analysis and probabilistic safety analysis
shall be provided to ensure the adequacy of the list of foreseeable accidents.
3. An analysis of the postulated initiating
events for the plant shall be made to establish the preventive measures and
protective measures that are necessary to ensure the fulfillment of safety
functions.
4. When a postulated initiating event occurs,
the conditions below must be satisfied in the following order of priority:
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b) After the event, the nuclear power plant
would return to the safe state by means of to the passive safety features or
the capability to operate continuously of the systems that control the
postulated initiating event;
c) After the event, the nuclear power plant
would return to the safe state due to the actuation of safety systems;
d) After the event, the nuclear power plant
would return to the safe state due to the implementation of specified
processes.
5. An engineering judgment shall be provided for
excluding from the design the initiating events not in the list of postulated
initiating events.
6. Where prompt and reliable action would be
necessary, the automatic actuation of safety systems must be designed to
prevent the postulated initiating events from escalating into more severe
conditions. Where prompt response would not be necessary, the safety system is
activated manually, or the operator may take actions instead of activating the
safety system, the following requirements must be satisfied:
a) The administrative, operational, and
emergency procedures shall be adequately specified;
An assessment of the potential for an operator
to worsen an event through incorrect diagnosis of the necessary recovery
process or erroneous operation of equipment shall be made in order to provide
suitable solutions;
c) Any equipment necessary for manual response
and the recovery processes shall be placed at most suitable locations to ensure
its availability at the time of need, and allow safe access to such equipment
under the environmental conditions anticipated.
7. The equipment and procedures necessary for
keeping control over the whole nuclear power plant and mitigating the
consequences under of a loss of control shall be provided.
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1. All foreseeable internal and external
hazards, including the hazards directly or indirectly caused by human shall be
identified and assessed. Hazards shall be assessed for determining the
postulated initiating events and consequences in the design of items important
to safety, including:
a) Internal hazards including fire, explosion,
flooding, missile generation, collapse of structures; falling objects, and pipe
whip;
b) Natural external hazards such as
meteorological, hydrological, geological and seismic events. Human induced
external hazards arising from military bases, industrial facilities, oil
storage, chemical storage, transport activities.
2. In the short term, the safety of the plant
shall not be dependent on off-site services such as electricity supply and fire
fighting services. The period of self-protection of the nuclear power plant is
determined based on the conditions off-site services conditions.
3. The seismic design of the plant must provide
a sufficient safety margin to protect the nuclear power plant against seismic
events and to cliff edge effects.
4. At the positions where many generating units
are located, the design must take due account the potential simultaneous
impacts on several generating units. The design must also take due account of
the independent safety of other generating units when one of them is damaged.
Article 10. Design basis
accidents
1. The conditions for identifying design basis
accidents are derived from the postulated initiating events for the purpose of
establishing the boundary conditions for the nuclear power plant.
2. Using the design basis accident conditions
prescribed in Clause 1 of this Article to identify the design basis of the
safety system and the items important to safety aiming to bringing the nuclear
power plant back to the safe state and mitigating the consequences of the
accidents that might occur. The conditions prescribed in Clause 1 of this
Article shall be used to define the design bases for safety systems and items
important to safety, with the objective of returning the plant to a safe state
and mitigating the consequences of any accidents.
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4. The analysis of the design basis accidents
must take due account of certain failures in safety systems, the errors of
design criteria, the use of postulations, models, and input parameters.
Article 11. Beyond design
basis accidents
1. The conditions for identifying beyond design
basis accidents are derived on the basis of engineering judgment, deterministic
assessments, and probabilistic assessments.
2. The analysis undertaken shall include
identification of the features that are designed for preventing beyond design
basis accidents and mitigating their consequences if they do occur. These
features must:
a) Be independent, especially for more frequent
accidents;
b) Capable of performing in the conditions
pertaining to beyond design basis accidents and severe accidents;
c) Have reliability commensurate with the
intended functions;
d) The features of containment must be able to
withstand extreme scenarios, including the melting of the reactor core.
3. The possibility of significant releases of
radioactive materials upon the occurrence of a beyond design basis accident
must be minimized. When radioactive releases occur, it is necessary to take
measures for spatially and temporally limiting the releases in order to protect
the public, and sufficient time shall be made available for implementing these
measures
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Article 12. Safety
classification
1. The items important to safety shall be
identified and classified based on their functions and importance to safety.
2. The interference between items important to
safety shall be prevented, and any failure of items important to safety in a
lower class must not affect the items important to safety in a higher class
3. The equipment that performs multiple
functions shall be classified according to the most important function.
Article 13. Design limits
1. The design limits consistent with the key
physical parameters for each item important to safety for the nuclear power
plant shall be specified for all operational states and for accident
conditions.
2. The design limits must be consistent with
national technical regulations and standards, and requirements from competent
agencies.
Article 14. Regulations on
the design process
1. The organizations that design the nuclear
power plant must provide for the design process of the items important to
safety consistent with the relevant national standards and technical
regulations, and the verified technological experience.
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Article 15. Design criteria
for safety
1. The design of equipment must take due account
of the possibility of common cause failures of items important to safety, the
determination and application of the requirements of the diversity, redundancy,
physical separation, and functional independence.
2. The single failure criterion shall be applied
as follows:
a) The single failure criterion shall be applied
to each safety group;
b) Each spurious action shall be considered to
be one mode of failure with regard to a safety group or a safety system;
c) The failure of a passive component must be
considered, unless it is certified to be reliable in the single failure
analysis. The failure of a passive component is very unlikely and its function
would remain unaffected by the postulated initiating events.
3. The fail-safe design shall be incorporated
into the systems and components important to safety, so that their failure or
the failure of a safety system support feature does not prevent the performance
of the safety function.
Article 16. Design of items
important to safety
1. The design of items important to safety must
be consistent with national standards, technical regulations, and requirements
from competent agencies.
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3. Then applying the national standards and
technical regulations prescribed in Clause 1 of this Article, the
applicability, conformity, and sufficiency of them must be evaluated. The
application of design that ensures safety functions better than the regulations
in such documents where necessary.
4. The items important to safety must be design
so that they can be manufactured, constructed, and installed in accordance with
the established procedure, ensure the achievement of intended features and
level of safety as prescribed.
5. The design basis must specify the capability,
reliability, and functionality of items important to safety for relevant
operational states, for accident conditions, and for conditions arising from internal
and external hazards; ensuring that the criteria are met over the lifetime of
the nuclear power plant.
6. The design basis for each item important to
safety shall be systematically justified and documented.
7. The items important to safety shall be
designed and located to minimize the likelihood of consequences and the impacts
of external hazards. Such design and location must be conformable with other
safety requirements.
8. The safety system support features (including
power cabling and control cabling) must be designed to minimize the impact
cause by the interactions among the buildings that contain items important to
safety, and other structures of the nuclear power plant in the conditions
arising from external hazards.
9. The items important to safety must be capable
of withstanding the impacts of external hazards considered in the design. If
not other features, such as passive barriers, shall be provided to protect the
nuclear power plant and to ensure that the safety functions of such items shall
be performed.
10. The potential hazards caused by the
interactions among the systems important to safety when they operate
simultaneously shall be evaluated and prevented.
11. When analyzing the potential hazards cause
by interactions among the systems important to safety, due account shall be
taken of the physical interconnections and possible effects of a system on the
working environment of another, to ensure that the changes in the working
environment do not affect the reliability of the system.
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13. The reliability of items important to safety
shall be commensurate with their safety significance, in particular:
a) The quality of items important to safety are
assessed and ensured in all stages of procurement, installation, qualification,
operation, and maintenance to be capable of withstanding all conditions arising
from design basis accidents:
b) In the selection of equipment, consideration
shall be given to both spurious operation and possible failures. The selection
of equipment of which the failures are easy to repair and replace.
14. The items important to safety must not be
compromised by disturbances in the electrical power grid, including
disturbances in the voltage and frequency.
Article 17. Safety systems
1. Interference between safety systems or
between redundant components of a system shall be prevented by means such as
physical separation, electrical isolation, functional independence and
independence of data transfer.
2. The safety system equipment of the safety
system, including cables and raceways, shall be readily identifiable in the
plant for each redundant safety system equipment.
3. Safety systems must not be shared between
generating units unless this contributes to safety enhancement.
4. Safety system support features and items
related to safety may be shared between generating units, unless it would
increase either the likelihood of an accident or the consequences of an
accident.
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The implementation and development of safety
measures, nuclear security measures, and the State system of accounting and
controlling nuclear materials of the nuclear power plant shall integrated so
that they do not compromise one another
Article 19. Operational
limits and conditions
The operational limits and conditions shall be
established in the design of the nuclear power plant, including:
1. The safety limits;
2. The limits to safety systems;
3. The operational limits and conditions for
operational state;
4. The system constraints and control procedure
constraints on the processes important to safety;
5. The requirements for surveillance,
maintenance, testing and inspection to ensure that structures, systems and components
function as intended in the design, to comply with the requirement for
optimization on the ALARA principle;
6. The operational configurations, including
operational restrictions in response to the failure of safety systems or
systems related to safety;
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Article 20. Calibration,
testing, maintenance, repair, replacement, inspection and monitoring of items
important to safety
The design of items important to safety must:
1. Facilitate their calibration, testing,
maintenance, repair, replacement, inspection, and monitor of the capability of
performing their functions and the maintenance of their integrity in all
conditions specified in their design basis;
2. Ensure that their calibration, testing,
maintenance, repair, replacement, inspection, and monitor do not cause
radiation overdose to the performers;
3. Ensure that their calibration, testing,
maintenance, repair, replacement, inspection, and monitor do not reduce the
reliability of safety functions;
4. If the items important to safety cannot be
designed to satisfy the requirements of testing, inspections or monitor to the
extent desirable, a reliable technical justification must be provided that
incorporates the following approaches
a) There are methods for testing, inspecting,
and supervising indirectly through reference items, or using verified
calculation methods; predictions shall be made for their replacements
b) There is sufficient safety margin to
compensate for possible failures.
Article 21. Qualification
of items important to safety
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2. The qualification program for items important
to safety must include the consideration of ageing effects caused by
environmental factors, including vibration, irradiation, humidity or
temperature. When the items important to safety are subject to natural external
events, the qualification program for such items in similar conditions that
happened before shall be considered.
3. The qualification program for items important
to safety shall take due account of all unfavorable environmental conditions
that could arise during the operation of the nuclear power plant.
Article 22. Ageing
management
1. The design life and margins of items
important to safety at a nuclear power plant shall be determined. The ageing,
neutron embrittlement and degradation shall be taken into account, ensuring the
capability of items to perform their necessary safety functions throughout
their design life.
2. The monitor, testing, sampling, and
inspection to assess ageing mechanism specified at the design stage shall be
carried out. The adverse changes of the nuclear power plant or degradation that
might occur during its operation shall be identified.
Article 23. Design for
optimal operator performance
1. The human factors shall be systematically
assessed, including human – machine interface for considering in the design.
2. The design must be consistent with the
required minimum number of workers to simultaneously perform all the operations
necessary to bring the plant into the safe state in abnormal operation or
accidents.
3. The design must be suitable for the
experience of the operators in similar nuclear power plants, and assist the
operators in judging and handling the situations arising during the operation
of the nuclear power plant and equipment maintenance.
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5. The human–machine interface design, and the
information provided for operators must be sufficient and manageable, suitable
for making decisions and take necessary actions.
6. The information necessary for operators
includes:
a) The general state of the plant;
b) The operational limits and conditions;
c) The information about the automatic actuation
of safety systems;
d) The information about the operation of
systems related to safety systems;
dd) The information about the necessity and time
for manual actuation of specified safety actions.
7. The working condition and environment must be
designed to ensure the safety and effectiveness of operators.
8. The design must facilitate the success of
operators’ even in a short period of time and under psychological impacts. The
need for intervention by the operator shall be minimized, and it shall be
demonstrated that the operator has sufficient time to make a decision and
sufficient time to act.
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10. Human factors shall be assessed to confirm
that necessary actions of operators are correctly performed; simulators may be
used if necessary.
Article 24. Requirements of
systems that contain fissile materials and radioactive materials
The systems in the nuclear power plant designed
to contain fissile materials and radioactive materials shall be able to:
1. Prevent the occurrence of events that could
lead to a loss of control and radioactive release to the environment;
2. Prevent criticality and overheating;
3. Keep the radioactive releases below
acceptable limits and as low as reasonably achievable in any situation;
4. Mitigate the radiological consequences of
accidents.
Article 25. Requirements of
radioactive waste management and the decommissioning of the nuclear power plant
The requirements of radioactive waste management
and the decommissioning the nuclear power plant must be consider at the design
stage, including:
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2. The facilities necessary for the treatment
and storage of radioactive waste generated during the operation and
decommissioning of the nuclear power plant;
3. The easy access and the means for handling.
Article 26. Safety system
support features
1. Support service systems that ensure the
operability of equipment being part of a system important to safety shall be
classified.
2. The reliability, redundancy, diversity, and
independence of safety system support features must be commensurate with the
significance to safety of the system being supported.
3. The failure of safety system support features
must not simultaneously affect the redundant components of the safety system or
a system that fulfill safety functions, and affect the capability to fulfill
safety functions of these systems.
Article 27. Requirements of
escape routes
1. The nuclear power plant must be provided with
a sufficient number of escape routes, clearly marked, with emergency lighting,
ventilation and other conditions essential to the safe use of these escape
routes in an emergency.
2. The escape routes from the nuclear power
plant must satisfy the requirements of competent State management agencies for
radiation zones, fire protection, industrial safety, and nuclear power plant
security.
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Article 28. Requirements of
communication system
1. The diverse means of communication must be
provided for internal and external communication. Those means must be
appropriately located and available in any circumstances.
2. Suitable alarm systems shall be provided to
give warnings and instructions in abnormal operation and accident conditions.
Article 29. Requirements of
access to the nuclear power plant and prevention of unauthorized acts
1. The nuclear power plant shall be isolated
from its surroundings with a suitable zoning. Various structural systems shall
be provided so that access to the plant can be controlled.
2. The zoning prescribed in Clause 1 of this
Article must take due account of access to the nuclear power plant in accident
conditions for taking emergency response measures.
3. The zoning prescribed in Clause 1 of this
Article must take due account of the control of access to the plant and
prevention of unauthorized access to or interference with the equipment of the
plant, especially the items important to safety.
Chapter III
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DESIGN OF SPECIFIC
SYSTEMS
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Article 30. Requirements of
fuel elements and fuel assemblies
1. Fuel elements and fuel assemblies must ensure
the period of use.
2. When assessing the quality of fuel elements
and fuel assemblies after a period of use, the following factors must be taken
into account:
a) The expansion and deformation;
b) The external pressure of the coolant;
c) The internal pressure of fission products and
helium accumulation;
d) The effects of irradiation;
dd) The variation in the pressure and
temperature resulting from the changes in the power of the nuclear power plant;
e) The chemical effects;
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g) The variations in the performance of heat
transfer resulting from distortions or chemical effects.
3. The limits on the permissible leakage of
fission products from the fuel shall be established so that the fuel remains
usable below such limits.
4. Fuel elements and fuel assemblies must be
able to withstand the effects related to the installation, dismantlement,
transportation, and storage as prescribed.
Article 31. Requirements of
the cooling capability and control rods
The geometrical design of fuel elements, fuel
assemblies, and supporting structures must ensure that the capability of
cooling is maintained, and the insertion of the control rods into the reactor
core is not impeded in operational states and in accident conditions, other
than severe accidents.
Article 32. Control of
neutrons in the reactor core
1. The neutron flux distribution in the reactor
core must be inherently stable in all operational state, including the states
arising after shutdown, and during or after refueling, and states arising from
abnormal operation; the quality of the reactor core does not degraded.
The need for the control system for maintaining
the shapes, levels and stability of the neutron flux within specified design
limits in all operational states shall be minimized.
2. Means of monitoring the neutron flux
distributions in the reactor core shall be provided for the purpose of ensuring
that the neutron flux in the core does not exceed the design limits.
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4. The maximum degree of positive reactivity and
rate of reactivity increase in operational states and accident conditions shall
be limited or compensated.
5. to maintain the capability for cooling and to
prevent any significant damage to the reactor core. prevent any resultant
failure of the pressure boundary of the reactor coolant systems, to maintain
the capability for cooling and to prevent any significant damage to the reactor
core. The quality reactor core must be assured over the lifetime of the nuclear
power plant. Failure of coolant pressure boundary must be prevented. The
capability of cooling must be maintained, and significant damage to the reactor
core must be prevented.
Article 33. Reactor shutdown
1. Means shall be provided to ensure the
capability to shut down the reactor in any situation, even when the positive
reactivity of the reactor is maximum.
2. The effectiveness, speed of action and
shutdown margin must ensure that that the design limits for fuel are not
exceeded.
3. When assessing the effectiveness of the means
of shutdown of the reactor, consideration shall be given the failures arising
in the plant that could make part of the means of shutdown inoperative or that
could result in a common cause failure.
4. The means for shutting down the reactor must
satisfy the following requirements:
a) There are at least two diverse and
independent systems for the purpose of excluding common cause failures. At least
on of the two reactors shutdown systems must be capable of keeping the reactor
subcritical by an adequate margin and with high reliability;
b) The increase in reactivity leading to
unintentional criticality during refueling, shutdown, or while the reactor is
in the shutdown state must be prevented.
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Section 2. REACTOR COOLENT
SYSTEM
Article 34. Requirements
for the reactor coolant system
1. The components of the reactor coolant systems
must satisfy the requirements of design and manufacture quality, material
quality, and inspection during their operation.
2. The pipework connected to the pressure
boundary must be designed to limit the leak of coolant through interfacing
systems, and to prevent the release of radioactive coolant.
3. The flaws must be prevented from initiating,
and any flaws that are initiated must be promptly detected, and the extension
of flaws must be prevented.
4. The embrittement of the components of the
coolant pressure boundary must be avoided.
5. A failure of a component contained inside the
coolant pressure boundary, such as pump impellers and valves, must not cause
damage to other components that are important to safety, in all operational
states and in accident conditions, with due account taken of their degradation.
Article 35. Overpressure protection of the coolant pressure
boundary
The operation of the pressure relief devices
must be ensured protect the coolant pressure boundary against overpressure at
any position, and prevent the release of radioactive materials directly to the
environment.
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1. The volume, temperature, and pressure of the
reactor coolant must not exceed the design limits in any operational state of
the nuclear power plant, with due account taken of the volumetric change and
leakage.
2. Adequate facilities shall be provided for the
removal of activated corrosion products and fission products deriving from the
fuel.
3. The capability of the facilities prescribed
in Clause 2 of this Article shall be based on the design limits on permissible
leakage of the fuel, with a sufficient margin to ensure a low level of circuit
activity, and that the radiation releases are below the acceptable limits and
are as low as reasonably achievable.
Article 37. Removal of
residual heat from the reactor core
Means shall be provided for the removal of
residual heat from the reactor core in the shutdown state of the reactor such
that the design limits for fuel, the coolant pressure boundary and structures
important to safety are not exceeded.
Article 38. Emergency
cooling of the reactor core
1. Means of cooling the reactor core shall be
provided. The cooling of the fuel under accident conditions shall be restored
and maintained even if the integrity of the coolant pressure boundary is not
maintained.
2. The means of cooling prescribed in Clause 1
of this Article must satisfy the following requirements:
a) The limiting parameters for the integrity of
the fuel cladding are not exceeded;
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c) The means of cooling of the reactor core are
effective and able to compensate for changes in the fuel and in the internal
geometry of the reactor core;
d) The cooling of the reactor core will be
ensured for a sufficient time.
3. The leak detection systems, interconnection
and isolation systems, suitable redundancy and diversity shall be provided to
fulfill the requirements in Clause 2 of this Article with high reliability for
each postulated initiating event.
Article 39. Heat transfer
to an ultimate heat sink
Systems shall be provided to transfer residual
heat from items important to safety to an ultimate heat sink with high
reliability for all plant states.
Section 3. CONTAINMENT
Article 40. Features of the
containment system
Features of the containment system:
1. Confinement of radioactive material and
radiation shielding in any situation;
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Article 41. Control of
radioactive releases from the containment
1. The containment shall be designed to ensure
that the radioactive release from the nuclear power plant to the environment is
kept as low as reasonably achievable, and below the acceptable limit.
2. The containment structure, the systems and
components affecting the leaktightness of the containment system shall be
designed and constructed so that the leak rate can be tested at the containment
design pressure during the operation of the plant.
3. The design of the penetrations through the
containment must satisfy the following requirements:
a) The number of penetrations through the
containment must be kept to a minimum. The features and other requirements
applicable the penetrations shall be kept at a level similar to that of the
containment itself.
b) The penetrations shall be able to with stand
the impacts caused by pipe movement and pipe whip, or accidents relevant to
missiles, external or internal events.
Article 42. Isolation of
the containment
1. Each line that penetrates the containment as
part of the coolant pressure boundary or that is connected directly to the
containment atmosphere shall:
a) Be automatically and reliably sealable in the
event of an accident;
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c) The fulfillment of the requirements
prescribed in Points a and b of this Clause may not necessary for the
instrument lines, or in cases in which the implementation of such requirements
reduces the reliability of the safety system that includes the penetrations
through the containment.
2. Each line that penetrates the containment and
is neither part of the coolant pressure boundary nor connected directly to the
containment atmosphere shall have at least one containment isolation valve
located outside the containment and as close to the containment as possible.
Article 43. Access the
containment
1. The access to the containment for operators
shall be through airlocks. The airlocks shall be equipped with doors that are
interlocked to ensure that at least one of the door is closed in any situation.
The entry and the corridors must be supervised. Provisions for ensuring the
safety of personnel shall be specified in the design.
2. Containment openings for the movement of
equipment or material shall be designed to be closed quickly and reliably in
the event that isolation of the containment is required.
Article 44. Control of
containment conditions
1. Systems shall be provided to control the
pressure, temperature, and buildup of fission products, or other gaseous,
liquid, and solid substances that might be released inside the containment and
that could affect the operation of systems important to safety.
2. The flow routes between separate compartments
inside the containment must be sufficient, and designed such that the pressure
differentials occurring during pressure equalization in accident conditions do
not result in unacceptable damage to the pressure bearing structure or systems
important to the mitigation of accident consequences.
3. The capability to remove heat from the
containment must be ensured to reduce and maintain pressure and temperature
inside the containment as low as possible after an accident that release
high-energy fluids. The systems that remove heat from the containment shall
have high reliability and redundancy.
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5. The systems that control the concentration of
hydrogen, oxygen, and other substances in the containment shall be provided to
prevent fire and explosion in accident conditions.
6. The use of coverings, thermal isolations, and
coatings for components and structures inside the containment must to ensure
the fulfillment of the safety functions even if they are damaged.
Section 4. MEASUREMENT AND
CONTROL SYSTEM
Article 45. Measurement
systems
1. The measurement systems must be capable of
determining the values of key parameters that could affect the fission process,
the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant system and the
containment in order to ensure the reliable operation and safety of the nuclear
power plant, determining the nuclear power plant in accident conditions, and
making decisions for the purposes of accident management.
2. The measurement equipment must provide
sufficient information to monitor the plant state and the course of accidents, to
predict the locations of release and the amount of radioactive material that
could be released and for post-accident analysis.
Article 46. Control systems
The control systems must be reliable and
suitable for limiting the relevant process variables within the specified
operational ranges.
Article 47. Protection
system
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a) Be capable of detecting the unsafe conditions
and activating safety systems automatically to achieve and maintain the safety
conditions for the nuclear power plant;
b) Be capable of overriding the unsafe actions
of the control systems;
c) Be capable of recovering the safety
conditions of the plant even in the event of failure of the protection system
itself;
d) Be capable of activating the safety system,
maintaining the automated actions within an appropriate period of time after
the occurrence of abnormal operation or accident conditions before the
intervention by operators;
dd) Provide information for operators for
monitoring the effects of automatic actions.
2. The design must be able to prevent the
operators from compromising the effectiveness of the protection system, but
must not impede the correct actions of operators in accident conditions.
Section 48. Reliability and
testability of measurement and control systems
1. The measurement and control systems for items
important to safety shall be designed for high reliability and periodic
testability commensurate with their safety functions.
2. The measurement and control systems must be
designed to facilitate the test, automatically notify system failures, and
automatically justify failures; must be provided with functional diversity and
diversity in concepts of operation to ensure the fulfillment of safety
functions in any situation.
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4. When a safety system, or part of a safety
system, has to be taken out of service for testing, clear directives on this
suspension for testing must be provided.
Article 49. Use of
computer-based equipment in systems important to safety
1. If a system important to safety is dependent
on computer-based equipment, appropriate provisions for the development and
testing of computer hardware and software shall be established and implemented
throughout the lifetime of the system, especially the relation to software
development. The entire development shall be subject to a quality management
system.
2. The computer-based equipment in systems
important to safety and safety related systems must:
a) Use software and hardware of high quality
commensurate with the importance of the system to safety;
b) Have the entire design process, including the
control, testing, and commissioning of design changes systematically
documented. These documents must be regularly reviewed;
c) Be assessed by the experts who are
independent from the design team and providers to ensure the high reliability;
d) Apply the principle of diverse design to
equipment important to safety of which the high reliability is not clearly
justified;
dd) Take due account of common cause failures
derived from computer software;
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Article 50. Separation of
protection systems and control systems
1. The protection system and control system must
be functionally independent, and the interference between which shall be
prevented by means of separation.
2. If signals are shared by both the protection
system and the control system, the signals must be classified as part of the
protection system. The separation of these two systems in this case must be
clearly justified.
Article 51. Control room
1. The control room must be designed to be safely
operated in all operational state either automatically or manually, and
measures must be taken to maintain the safe state of the nuclear power plant or
to bring the nuclear power plant back to the safe state after abnormal
operation and accident conditions.
2. The control room and the external environment
must be appropriately separated. Adequate information must be provided to
protect the personnel in the control room from the hazards resulting from
accident conditions such as high radiation levels, release of radioactive
materials, fire, explosion, or toxic gases.
3. The accidents inside and outside the control
room that could affect the continuous operation of the control room must be
analyze, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate the consequences
of the accidents that do occur.
Article 52. Supplementary
control room.
1. A supplementary control room with measurement
and control equipment that is physically, electrically, and functionally
separate from the control room prescribed in Article 51 of this Circular shall
be kept available.
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3. The requirements of the protection of
personnel prescribed in Clause 2 Article 51 also apply to the supplementary
control room.
Article 53. Emergency
control center
1. The nuclear power plant must have an on-site
emergency control center that is separate from the control room and the
supplementary control room.
2. The information about the important the plant
parameters, the radiological conditions at the nuclear power plant, and the
immediate surroundings must be displayed in the center.
3. The center must be provided with means of
communication with the control room, the supplementary control room, and other
important locations in the plant, and with emergency response units.
4. Appropriate measures shall be taken to
protect the personnel of the emergency control centre for a protracted time
against hazards resulting from accident conditions.
5. The emergency control centre must be provided
with necessary systems and services to permit protract the working time of
emergency response personnel.
Section 5. Emergency power
supply
Article 54. Emergency power
supply
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2. The design basis for the emergency power
supply at the nuclear power plant shall take due account of the postulated
events and the associated safety functions to determine the requirements for
capability, availability, required duration of the power supply, capacity and
continuity.
3. The combination of emergency power supply
sources such as water, steam or gas turbines, diesel engines or batteries, must
be reliable and conformable with the requirements for power supply of safety
systems; the design must facilitate the testing of the system functions.
4. The design of diesel engines and generators
that provide emergency power supply for items important to safety must satisfy
the following requirements:
a) The capability of fuel oil storage and supply
systems must satisfy the demand within a specified period of time;
b) The generators are able to start and function
under any condition and at any time;
c) Auxiliary systems of the generators such as
cooling systems must be provided.
Section 6. SUPPORTING SYSTEMS
AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS
Article 55. Performance of
supporting systems and auxiliary systems
The design of supporting systems and auxiliary
systems must ensure that the performance of these systems is consistent with
the importance to safety of the systems or components that they serve.
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The systems and components of the nuclear power
plant that operate all the time (even in accident conditions) must be provided
with auxiliary systems to remove heat. The auxiliary parts of the heat
transport system must be isolated.
Article 57. Process
sampling systems and post-accident sampling systems
1. Process sampling systems and post-accident
sampling systems shall be provided for promptly determining the concentration
of radionuclides in fluid process systems, and in gas and liquid samples taken
from systems or from the environment, in all operational states and in accident
conditions.
2. Appropriate measures shall be taken for
monitoring the activity in gas fluid systems that have the potential for
radioactive contamination, and for the sampling.
Article 58. Compressed air
systems
In the design basis, the quality, flow rate, and
cleanness of the air supplied for the compressed air systems shall be
specified.
Article 59. Air
conditioning systems and ventilation systems
1. Appropriate air conditioning, air heating and
ventilation systems shall be provided in the nuclear power plant to maintain
the environmental conditions necessary for the systems and components important
to safety.
2. The capability of air cleaning of ventilation
systems in buildings must satisfy the following requirements:
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b) The concentration of airborne radioactive
substances in the areas accessed by personnel is below the prescribed limits;
c) The level of airborne radioactive substances
within the nuclear power plant is below the limits and kept as low aw
reasonably achievable;
d) The ventilation in the rooms that contain
inert gases or noxious gases does not impair the capability to control
radiation;
dd) The release of gaseous radioactive material
to the environment is below acceptable limits and kept as low as reasonably
achievable.
2. Lower pressure (partial vacuum) shall be
maintained in areas where radioactive contamination is higher, and in
accessible areas.
Article 60. Fire protection
systems
1. Fire protection systems, including fire
detection and fire extinguishing systems, fire containment barriers, and smoke
control system shall be provided throughout the nuclear power plant, with due
account taken of the fire hazard analysis results.
2. The fire protection system at the nuclear
power plant must be capable of dealing with all fire scenarios.
3. The fire extinguishing systems must be
capable of automatic actuation where appropriate. The design and location of
fire extinguishing systems must ensure that their abnormal operation would not
significantly impair the capability of items important to safety.
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5. The fire detection systems and fire extinguishing
system in postulated initiating events must be able to resist the effects of
these events.
6. Non-combustible and heat resistant materials
shall be used wherever practicable throughout the plant, especially in the
containment and the control room.
Article 61. Lighting
systems
Adequate lighting shall be provided in all
operational areas of the nuclear power plant in operational states and in
accident conditions.
Article 62. Overhead
lifting equipment
1. The items important to safety and other items
in the proximity the items important to safety shall be lifted and lowered by
equipment.
2. The design overhead lifting equipment shall:
a) Prevent the lifting of excessive loads;
b) Prevent unintentional dropping;
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d) Have safety interlocks;
dd) Provided with anti-earthquake design if they
are used in the areas where items important to safety are located.
Section 7. POWER CONVERSION
SYSTEMS
Article 63. Steam supply
system, water supply system and generators
1. The design of the steam supply system, water
supply system and turbine generators shall ensure that the coolant pressure
boundary is not exceeded in any situation.
2. The steam supply system must have qualified
steam isolation valves capable of closing in any situation.
3. The design and capacity steam supply system
and water supply system shall be able to prevent abnormal operation from
escalating to accident conditions.
4. Turbine generators must be designed to resist
vibration and overspeed. Appropriate measures shall be taken for minimize the
effects turbine-generated missiles on items important to safety
Section 8. SYSTEMS FOR
TREATMENT OF RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE
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1. Systems shall be provided for treating solid
radioactive waste and liquid radioactive waste at the nuclear power plant to
keep the amounts and concentrations of radioactive releases below the
authorized limits and as low as reasonably achievable.
2. Systems and facilities shall be provided for
the management and storage of radioactive waste in the nuclear power plant for
a period of time consistent with the disposal option.
3. The design of the plant shall incorporate
appropriate features to facilitate the transport and handling of radioactive
waste. Consideration shall be given to the access of equipment that lift and
pack radioactive waste.
Article 65. Systems for
treatment and control of liquid and gaseous effluents
1. Systems shall be provided for treating and
residual liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents to keep their amounts below
the authorized limits, and as low as reasonably achievable.
2. Liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents
shall be treated at the plant so that exposure of the public due to discharges
to the environment is as low as reasonably achievable.
3. The design of the plant shall incorporate
suitable means to keep the release of liquid radioactive effluents to the
environment below the authorized limits and as low as reasonably achievable.
4. The cleanup equipment for the gaseous
radioactive substances shall provide the necessary retention factor to keep
radioactive releases below the authorized limits. The efficiency for filter
systems must be testable. The performance and function of these systems must be
regularly monitored over their lifetime. The filter cartridges must be able to
be replaced while the air is passing.
Section 9. FUEL HANDLING AND
STORAGE SYSTEMS
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1. The fuel handling and storage systems shall
be provided at the nuclear power plant to maintain the fuel control at all
times during fuel handling and storage.
2. The design of the nuclear power plant must
facilitate the lifting, movement and handling of fresh fuel and spent fuel.
3. The design of the nuclear power plant must
prevent significant damage to the items important to safety during the transfer
of fuel or casks, or in the event of fuel or casks being dropped.
4. The systems of handling and storing fresh fuel
and spent fuel must:
a) Prevent crititicality by physical means or by
means of physical processes or by a specified margin, and preferably by use of
appropriate geometrical configurations;
b) Facilitate the inspection of fuel;
c) Facilitate the maintenance, periodic
inspection of components important to safety;
d) Prevent damage to the fuel;
dd) Prevent the dropping of fuel in transit;
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g) Provide proper means for radiation
protection;
h) Provide adequate operating procedures and a
system of accounting for, and control of nuclear fuel.
5. The systems of handling and storing spent
fuel must:
a) Allow removal of heat from the fuel in any
situation;
b) Prevent causing unacceptable handling stresses
on fuel elements or fuel assemblies;
c) Prevent the dropping of fuel in transit;
d) Prevent the potential dropping of heavy
objects that damage fuel;
dd) Keep suspect or damaged fuel elements or
fuel assemblies safe;
e) Control levels of soluble absorber if this is
used for criticality safety;
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h) Facilitate decontamination of fuel handling
and storage areas and equipment;
i) Accommodate all fuel take from the reactor
core in accordance with the plan for core management;
k) Facilitate the transit of fuel form the
storage and the preparation for off-site transport.
6. When the nuclear power plant uses water pools
for fuel storage, the design of the plant must be able to:
a) Control the temperature, chemical properties,
and activity of the water use for handling or storing spent fuel;
b) Monitor and control the water level in the
pools, and detect leakage;
c) Prevent the exposure of fuel elements and
fuel assemblies in the pool due to pipe break.
Section 10. RADIATION
PROTECTION
Article 67. Design for
radiation protection
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2. Radiation sources in the plant and radiation
risks associated with them shall be identified. The exposure form these sources
shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable. The integrity of the fuel
cladding shall be maintained. The generation, development, and effects of
corrosion products and activation products shall be controlled
3. Materials used in the manufacture of
structures, systems and components shall be selected to minimize activation of the
material.
4. Technical measures shall be taken to prevent
the release of radioactive substances, radioactive waste, and radioactive
contamination in the nuclear power plant.
5. The design of the nuclear power plant must
ensure that the access of personnel to areas with potential exposure and areas
of possible radioactive contamination is controlled. Exposures and radioactive
contamination shall be prevented or minimized by controlling means and
ventilation systems.
6. The nuclear power plant shall be divided into
zones according to the level of radiation and radioactive contamination in the
operation of the nuclear power plant (including refueling, maintenance and
inspection); the areas of potential radiation and contamination in accident
conditions shall be identified. Shielding shall be provided so that radiation
exposure is prevented or minimized.
7. The design of the nuclear power plant must
ensure that the doses received by the personnel during the during normal
operation, refueling, maintenance and inspection are kept as low as reasonably
achievable, special equipment shall be used to meet these requirements.
8. The equipment subject to frequent maintenance
or manual operation shall be located in areas of low dose rate to minimize the
exposure of workers.
9. Facilities shall be provided for the
decontamination of operating personnel and plant equipment.
Article 68. Means of
radiation monitoring
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2. Stationary dose rate meters shall be provided
for monitoring local radiation dose rates at plant locations that are routinely
accessible by personnel, and where the changes in radiation levels in
operational states allow the access of personnel for certain specified periods
of time.
3. The stationary dose rate meter shall:
a) Display the radiation levels at the necessary
plant locations in accident conditions;
b) Provide sufficient information n the control
room and control positions so that personnel can intervene if necessary.
4. The stationary radiation monitors shall be
capable of measuring the activity of radioactive substances in the atmosphere
in areas routinely occupied by personnel and where the radioactivity might be
such as to necessitate protective measures. The detected concentration of
radionuclides shall be displayed in the control room and other necessary
positions. Radiation monitors shall be installed areas subject to possible
contamination as a result of equipment failure or other unusual circumstances.
5. Stationary equipment and laboratories shall
be provided for promptly determining the radiation concentration in fluid
process systems, in gas and liquid samples taken from plant systems or from the
environment in operational states and in accident conditions.
6. Stationary equipment shall be provided for
monitoring radioactive effluents and effluents with possible contamination
during discharges from the plant to the environment
7. Instruments shall be provided for measuring
surface contamination. Stationary monitors, including portal radiation
monitors, hand and foot monitors, shall be provided at the exits from controlled
areas and supervised areas to control the radiation for operating personnel and
equipment
8. Facilities shall be provided for monitoring
exposure and radioactive contamination of operating personnel, for the purposes
of assessing and recording the cumulative doses to personnel over the period of
working at the nuclear power plant.
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a) Exposure pathways to people, including the
food chain;
b) Radiological impacts, if any, on the local
environment;
c) The possible accumulation or radioactive
substances in the environment;
d) The possibility of unauthorized radioactive releases.
Chapter IV
REGULATIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
Article 69. Effects
1. This Circular takes effect after 45 days from
the date on which it is signed.
2. Organizations and individuals are recommended
to send feedbacks on the difficulties arising during the course of
implementation to the Ministry of Science and Technology for amendment and
supplementation./.
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FOR THE
MINISTER
DEPUTY MINISTER
Le Dinh Tien